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Abstract 
We respond to the comments of Logie and Vandierendonck to our article proposing benchmark 
findings for evaluating theories and models of short-term and working memory. The response 
focuses on the two main points of criticism: (1) Logie and Vandierendonck argue that the scope of 
the set of benchmarks is too narrow. We explain why findings on how working memory are used in 
complex cognition, findings on executive functions, and findings from neuropsychological case 
studies are currently not included in the benchmarks, and why findings with visual and spatial 
materials are less prevalent among them. (2) The critics question the usefulness of the benchmarks 
and their ratings for advancing theory development. We explain why selecting and rating 
benchmarks is important and justifiable, and acknowledge that the present selection and rating 
decisions are in need of continuous updating. The usefulness of the benchmarks of all ratings is also 
enhanced by our concomitant on-line posting of data for many of these benchmarks. 
Key words: Working memory, short-term memory, executive functions, benchmarks, commentary  
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We appreciate our colleagues' thoughtful commentaries on our article (Oberauer et al., in 
press). They raised several important issues and pointed out limitations of our efforts to compile a 
set of benchmarks for theories and models of short-term and working memory. We take their 
arguments as constructive critiques that give us an opportunity to clarify what we intended to 
achieve with our proposal, and assist the further development of the present benchmarks towards a 
broader consensus among researchers about the empirical basis of our theoretical efforts. Here we 
respond to their arguments. 
Is the Scope too Narrow? 
Both commentators express concerns about our decision to exclude findings on the role of 
working memory (WM) in specific cognitive activities, such as arithmetic, reasoning, and language 
processing, as well as the relation of working memory to executive functions (Logie, in press; 
Vandierendonck, in press). Vandierendonck in particular would have preferred a set of benchmarks 
for unified theories of cognition. Building a unified theory of cognition is a different, much more 
ambitious endeavor than building a comprehensive theory of WM. We believe that there is value in 
working towards a better theory of WM in its own right. Such a theory will form a solid foundation 
for understanding how WM contributes to other aspects of our mental life. Eventually, the success of 
a theory of WM will depend on how useful it is for that purpose. However, aiming to explain with 
high priority the contributions of WM to the broad range of complex human cognitive activities 
would set the bar impossibly high for a theory of how WM works, given our limited state of 
knowledge.  
The Use of Working Memory in Complex Cognition 
Vandierendonck cites several lines of research on the role of WM in arithmetic, reasoning, 
and language comprehension. The predominant results from this research address which processes 
in arithmetic, reasoning, or language processing depend on WM. As such, they inform theories of 
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these cognitive activities, but they do not tell us much about WM itself, other than underscoring its 
importance within the cognitive system.  
We agree that it is crucial for an adequate conceptualization of WM to consider its role in 
cognition more generally: What is it there for, and how does it accomplish its function? At the same 
time, we disagree with Logie's claim that asking how WM theories explain the use of WM in everyday 
life is a "stronger test" than focusing on the "artificial tasks" from which most of the benchmark 
findings arise (Logie, in press; p. 10). We are not aware of any instance in which research on the use 
of WM for a particular cognitive task or activity has been leveraged to adjudicate between competing 
theories of WM. This paucity of relevant instances is unsurprising: There are principled reasons for 
why making such an argument is difficult. Take, for instance, research on how the syntactic 
complexity of sentences affects the difficulty of sentence comprehension, and of concurrent 
maintenance of a WM load (e.g., Loncke, Desmet, Vandierendonck, & Hartsuiker, 2011). Any 
explanation of findings from this kind of study will have to make assumptions not only about WM but 
also about sentence comprehension, and in particular syntactic parsing. Therefore, any inference in 
favor or against an assumption about WM is likely to stand and fall with the assumptions about 
language processing that it is combined with to explain the data. There is thus a good reason why 
WM researchers often prefer simple, artificial tasks: Explaining findings from them does not require 
as many risky assumptions about how people process the task in addition to assumptions about WM.  
Executive Functions 
The relation of WM to executive functions (EF) deserves special consideration. Many 
theorists assume that the constructs WM and EF are closely related (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Kane & 
Engle, 2002); others don't share that view (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1992; Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014). 
The matter is complicated by the fact that the scope of the term EF is not well defined itself. We 
were aware that any decision on how to draw the line between findings to consider and findings not 
to consider as benchmarks in this thematic area could be perceived as biased in one or the other 
direction. We decided to include only those findings that speak to the question how, and how 
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strongly, WM and EF are related, and to exclude those that speak to questions about how specific 
forms of EF operate in specific paradigms or phenomena (e.g., how conflict is resolved in the flanker 
task, or what role inhibition plays in retrieval-induced forgetting). Because the concept of EF is ill 
defined and strongly theory-dependent, we included findings on the relation between WM and EF 
without using the term EF, using instead more specific and arguably more precise terms. We 
identified the following lines of evidence on the relation between WM and EF:  
(a) Some authors consider all forms of processing that involve central attention (e.g., 
response selection, retrieval from LTM) as instances of EF (e.g., Szmalec, Vandierendonck, & Kemps, 
2005). On this definition, the effects of concurrent processing on maintenance (BM 5.1) are an 
instance of the interplay of WM and EF.  
(b) Updating of WM has been identified as one form of EF (Miyake et al., 2000). Where 
available, we included evidence from experimental paradigms involving updating across all 
benchmarks (see task codes NB and MU in the reference tables of the target article). However, few 
findings that met the criteria for benchmarks were specific to the updating of WM. This could reflect 
the fact that, despite its prominent place in the conceptual network of EF, the process of updating 
WM has not yet attracted enough systematic efforts to establish robust, general, and theoretically 
informative findings (for some recent efforts in that direction see Ecker, Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & 
Chee, 2010; Kessler & Oberauer, 2014; Rac-Lubashevsky & Kessler, 2016). One could argue – as 
Vandierendonck does – that switching between task sets is an instance of updating (procedural) WM, 
and task-set switching research has amassed a wealth of well-established findings (reviewed by 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010). We decided against including this body of work because the 
interpretation of task-set switching as an instance of WM updating is, as far as we see, far from 
universally accepted. Unsurprisingly, therefore, theories and computational models of task-set 
switching are to the most part specific to task-set switching and do not speak to other aspects of 
WM.  
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(c) Cognitive control (i.e., avoiding distraction, avoiding strong but wrong action tendencies) 
is universally acknowledged as a prototypical EF. Cognitive control has been related to WM primarily 
through correlational findings, which figure as BM 12.6. Other research has investigated how 
cognitive-control demands affect concurrent maintenance of unrelated material in WM (Barrouillet, 
Portrat, & Camos, 2011; Liefooghe, Barrouillet, Vandierendonck, & Camos, 2008), and found that 
there is nothing special about control demands – they have the same effect on maintenance as other 
central processing demands. We therefore included these findings in BM 5.1. Hence, we have 
included cognitive control phenomena in the benchmarks, albeit not under a dedicated benchmark 
labeled "cognitive control".    
Neuropsychological Case Studies 
Logie criticizes the fact that we largely excluded neuropsychological case studies that 
demonstrate dissociations between functions of working memory. The problem with single-case 
studies is that it is difficult to establish their replicability, and even harder to establish their 
generality, because case studies are, by definition, not a representative sample from any population 
(for related arguments see Miyake, Carpenter, & Just, 1994; Miyake, Carpenter, & Just, 1995). At the 
same time, we acknowledge that neuropsychological case studies have been very important in 
informing theories of working memory (Baddeley, Gathercole, & Papagno, 1998; Della Sala, Logie, 
Trivelli, Cubelli, & Marchetti, 1998). We hope that, for a future update of the benchmarks, we will 
find a way to systematically establish which findings from neuropsychological case studies are 
sufficiently robust and general to warrant crediting them with benchmark status.  
Findings with Visual and Spatial Materials  
Vandierendonck further criticizes what he considers to be our selective omission of many 
findings with visual and spatial materials.  Specifically, he proposes that the syllable-based word-
length effect (BM 7) is just one example of a broader set of complexity effects that includes 
phenomena in the spatial domain such as effects of path length, path crossings, and symmetry. In 
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our discussions we considered this expansion of BM 7, but eventually decided against it because we 
thought that it would be an overly strong theoretical commitment to subsume this diverse set of 
effects under a common category of complexity effects. Doing so would have expressed a certain 
degree of conviction that these effects are likely to have a common explanation, and we were not 
sufficiently confident in that assumption. The commonality of these phenomena is less clear than in 
other cases where we did subsume similar phenomena under a general description, such as the 
effects of presentation time for visual arrays and those of presentation rate for verbal lists (BM 2.4).  
We are confident that future empirical work on the effects of the characteristics of spatial paths, 
spatial configurations, and also non-spatial visual configurations (Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Brady & 
Tenenbaum, 2013) will establish many of them well enough to include them in the next update of 
the benchmarks. 
How to use Benchmarks to Evaluate Theories? 
A second point of skepticism raised by both commentators pertains to how the benchmarks 
should be used to evaluate theories. Should a theory that explains N benchmark findings be 
preferred over one that explains only N-K benchmark findings but additionally explains K other 
findings that are not benchmarks? Should a theory that explains N benchmarks with A ratings be 
preferred over one that accounts for equally many benchmarks with B or C ratings?  
If the theory is intended as a theory of WM, then our answer is Yes. The premise of our 
endeavor is that not all empirical findings are equally important for evaluating theories. A theory's 
ability to explain findings that are well-replicated, that generalize over a broad range of materials, 
experimental paradigms, and populations, and that have informed theoretical decisions and debates, 
should count for more than its ability to explain findings lacking one or more of these features. Our 
critics have not presented an argument against this position. There might be exceptions – it is 
conceivable that a finding, although being highly specific to one paradigm and one kind of material, 
has profound implications for theories, and as such should be regarded a benchmark. We are open to 
such an argument and would consider including such a finding in the next version of the benchmarks. 
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We hope that our article lays the ground for a conversation about the importance of empirical 
phenomena for theory development and theory testing, and that through such a conversation the 
set of benchmarks will continue to evolve.  
Vandierendonck, if we understand him correctly, accepts our general premise but believes 
that our selection and rating of benchmarks is biased. At the same time, Logie argues that a 
democratic approach – a popularity contest among empirical findings – is not a suitable approach for 
prioritizing findings, and we agree. These two comments highlight the inevitable tension between 
judgments made by a small group of experts – with a high risk of individual biases – and judgments 
based on a much broader group of stakeholders – risking the irrationalities of a popularity contest. 
We tried to strike a balance between these two risks by making selection and rating decisions 
through a consensus among researchers with diverse views1, based on explicit criteria, and informed 
– but not determined – by a broader expert survey. We maintain that the result is much less biased 
than the selection of findings undertaken by any individual theorist or team. We propose the 
benchmarks in the target article as a first step in the direction of a systematic, rational, and unbiased 
ranking of findings by their importance for theory building and evaluation – not as its end product.  
Logie takes issue with the ranking of benchmarks as A, B, or C, arguing that the A-ranked 
findings are not the ones that are most important for theory evaluation, but those that are most 
popular among researchers because they are the easiest to research, or the easiest to explain, or the 
ones that have been around long enough to be replicated and extended many times. As the present 
collection of benchmarks is a snapshot at one historical time point, it inevitably reflects historical 
trends in our discipline: There are more findings with verbal than visual and spatial materials in part 
because, for a long time, it was easier to present verbal stimuli to participants. Serial-position curves 
(an A benchmark) are more robustly and more generally established than the neurally silent short-
                                                          
1 Some of us propose unitary theories of working memories whereas others advocate multi-component 
theories; some of us believe that decay plays an important role in explaining short-term forgetting, others 
question such a role, and others still assume that working memory is limited by a discrete capacity, or a 
continuously varying resource. Some of us see a clear division between short-term/working memory on the 
one hand and long-term memory on the other, whereas others prefer a more unitary view of memory. 
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term maintenance of information (a C benchmark) because the former were first described more 
than a century ago (Nipher, 1878), whereas the latter had to await methods that were developed 
only very recently. There is no way to compensate for these imbalances except for researchers to fill 
in the missing evidence in the coming decades: Some of the novel findings will turn out to be 
replicable and general; others will not – until we know which of them do, it would be premature to 
assign them high evidential value for theory decisions.   
If we grant WM researchers some degree of rationality in choosing their research questions, 
the historical trends are not entirely arbitrary: Findings that speak to important theoretical questions 
tend to attract follow-up research, and findings that are replicable and general tend to be built on by 
further empirical work that establishes them even more firmly. We assigned benchmarks rank A not 
merely on the grounds that they have been demonstrated very often, but on the grounds that they 
have attracted much research for good reasons. 
 We do not think that there is any risk that phenomena that missed out on the highest 
priority ranking for modelling will now be ignored.  To the contrary, where we rated benchmarks as B 
or C because these phenomena required additional replication or generalization, that may even 
signal to researchers that a particular phenomenon is widely viewed as a fruitful target for new 
research efforts. 
In other instances, findings were rated as B or C because they reflect more nuanced aspects 
of the more overarching category A benchmarks (for example, in serial recall fill-in and infill errors 
are a more nuanced feature of the locality constraint on transpositions; see BM 4.1.1 and 4.1.2). It is 
therefore reasonable to start with a theory that can explain the A benchmarks before accounting for 
the B and C benchmarks. We agree with Logie that the latter benchmarks may ultimately have more 
power to discriminate between theories, but focusing first on explaining the B and C benchmarks 
engenders the risk that theorists may invoke specialized mechanisms and assumptions that 
undermine a theory's ability to capture the A benchmark that describes the more general 
phenomenon. A model of the solar system has to explain seasons, the lengths of days and the 
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retrograde motion of Mars first, before we would worry about whether it can also predict a lunar 
eclipse. A model that predicts the latter but not the former is of little use, and no astronomer would 
seriously entertain it. 
One final comment on the ratings: They are intended as guidelines for theorists aiming to 
explain how short-term or working memory works. Other theoretical aims warrant other selections 
and rank-orderings of phenomena to explain. In particular, a researcher who aims to build a theory 
with a narrower scope (e.g., focusing on the role of verbal serial recall in word learning) would be 
well advised to focus on those benchmarks that are most relevant to that endeavor, and give higher 
priority to B and C benchmarks within that set than to A-rated benchmarks outside it.  
Are the Benchmarks Constraining Research? 
Logie worries that the publication of a set of benchmarks discourages the search for novel 
findings. The past decades have witnessed a high rate of novel empirical discoveries, accompanied by 
a much slower rate of theory development. The strong incentives for generating novel empirical 
results – after all, they are the most common entrance ticket for peer-reviewed publications – will 
not go away soon. We are not worried that the empirical innovation in our field might slow down; 
rather, we are worried that it might continue through idle cycles of phenomena being discovered, 
firmly established, and analyzed in much detail by a flurry of studies until the empirical landscape 
becomes so complex that all hope for a complete explanation dissipates, upon which the area is 
abandoned. We believe that, as scientists, we have a responsibility to not only generate new findings 
but also to strive for better, more comprehensive explanations of the existing ones. Doing so will put 
more emphasis on developing strong theories which, in turn, would guide future empirical research 
towards questions of theoretical relevance, and away from phenomena-driven research.  
Logie further argues that focusing our theoretical efforts on well-established findings is post-
hoc and even circular, and that theory tests should focus on new predictions instead. This argument 
would have force if we lived in a world in which most competing theories can explain most of the 
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existing, well-established findings, so that we need to look for new empirical tests to adjudicate 
between them. As we see it, the reality of WM research is far from such a state. No existing theory or 
model of WM currently provides a joint explanation of even the A-rated benchmarks. As we 
elaborate in the Discussion of the target article, a satisfactory explanation would require a theory or 
model to not only be compatible with a finding but to imply it in such a way that the absence of that 
finding would be incompatible with the theory (Roberts & Pashler, 2000). Moreover, a joint 
explanation requires the theory or model to use the same assumptions, and ideally the same (or 
similar) parameter values for its explanation of each benchmark. This is a high standard for theorists, 
and a theory or model that reaches it would have considerably more explanatory power than any 
existing one. Therefore, the benchmarks are highly informative for adjudicating between theories.  
Logie proposes an alternative approach to using empirical findings for evaluating theories. 
His proposal is to put together a set of well-established findings without differentiating among them 
by priority. Researchers should compare pairs of competing theories on the subset of findings that 
are associated to one or both of the competing theories. We fully agree with the rationale of this 
approach. The proposal is to select findings – among those for which replicability and some degree of 
generality has been established – by whether they are relevant for the theories in question. We 
understand our effort as an attempt to generalize the approach that Logie proposed, considering not 
just two competing theories but all currently competing theories of short-term and working memory 
jointly.2 To that end we defined theoretical leverage – the ability of a finding to inform, and 
adjudicate between, existing theories of short-term and working memory – as a criterion for 
selecting and rating benchmarks. 
                                                          
2 We also considered past theories that were eliminated from the competition by certain findings. For example, 
the mixed-list similarity effect, BM 8.1.2, was important to rule out chaining models of serial recall. These 
findings are included in the benchmarks because every new theory must explain them to not immediately meet 
the fate of those older theories.  
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Concluding Remarks 
The process of putting together a set of benchmarks is arguably more important than the 
current outcome. The set we proposed in the target article certainly has its limitations, and will 
evolve over the coming decades. Our main purpose was to highlight the need for a shared set of 
targets for theories and models to explain, and to propose a process by which researchers in a field 
can work towards a consensus on these targets. We hope that others working on short-term and 
working memory will join us to carry this effort into the future, and that colleagues working in other 
fields of research will be inspired to embark in similar endeavors. To get involved, interested 
researchers could comment on the benchmarks on our web page,3 or get in touch with one of the 
first two authors for proposing a new benchmark or a revision of the existing ones.4 Researchers can 
also offer data sets for any existing or newly-accepted benchmarks to be included in our unified, on-
line posting.5 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
3 URL: https://wmbenchmarks.wordpress.com/   
4 k.oberauer@psychologie.uzh.ch; stephan.lewandowsky@bristol.ac.uk 
5 URL: https://github.com/oberauer/BenchmarksWM.git, and https://osf.io/g49c6/  
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